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MATERIALITY: AN ELEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 1001
AND A QUESTION FOR THE JURY
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years the federal government has intensified its efforts
to reduce fraudulent practices in the area of competition for government
contracts.1 A favorite weapon of the government in prosecuting procure-
ment fraud is 18 U.S.C. § 1001.2 This statute penalizes the concealment
of material facts and the making of false statements within the jurisdic-
tion of any department or agency of the federal government.3 Most fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals also require that false statements be material
to constitute a violation of section 1001. 4 However, the circuit courts are
split on whether materiality is an issue of law or fact. A majority require
that the question of materiality under section 1001 be decided by the
court as a question of law,5 but a minority maintain that materiality
should be decided by the trier of fact.6
1. Shirk, Greenburg & Dawson, Truth or Consequences: Expanding Civil and Criminal
Liability For the Defective Pricing of Government Contracts, 37 CATH. U.L. REv. 935, 935-39
(1988).
2. Id. at 969-70. Section 1001 reads in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
4. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (lst Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley,
786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359,
1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180
(6th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 n.8
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346,
349 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975); Freidus v. United
States, 223 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
5. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31 n.3 (First Circuit); Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327 (Seventh Cir-
cuit); Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (Third Circuit); Lopez, 728 F.2d at 1362 n.4 (Eleventh Circuit);
Abadi, 706 F.2d at 180 (Sixth Circuit); United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.4 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bernard,
384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
6. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 n.8 (Tenth Circuit); Valdez, 594 F.2d at 729 (Ninth Circuit).
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In Sinclair v. United States,7 the United States Supreme Court stated
that materiality should be decided by a court as a question of law (the
Sinclair rule).' However, In re Winship9 requires that every element of a
criminal offense be decided by the trier of fact (the Winship rule). 10 If
materiality is an "element" of a section 1001 offense, then both of these
rules apply to the materiality requirement of section 1001.11 The conver-
gence and incompatibility of these two rules on the issue of materiality in
section 1001 accounts for the aforementioned circuit split. 12
This Comment summarizes the current law regarding the section
1001 materiality question, and determines whether the Sinclair rule or
the Winship rule controls. Section II of this Comment contains a brief
description of section 1001 and an explanation of Sinclair and Winship.
The Comment then examines how each federal circuit court reconciles
the conflicting precedent, and how each decides the section 1001 materi-
ality question. Section III states the problem presented by the clash of
these two cases on the materiality question.
Section IV examines whether Sinclair and Winship are actually in
conflict by exploring the question of whether materiality is an "element"
of'a section 1001 offense. Concluding that materiality is an element and
therefore both Sinclair and Winship apply to the section 1001 materiality
question, this Comment discusses the prospect of treating the Sinclair
rule as an exception to the Winship rule. Additionally, this Comment
addresses whether recent United States Supreme Court decisions require
that materiality be treated as a question of law. The Comment concludes
that, to the extent proof of materiality is required to convict under sec-
tion 1001, materiality must be treated as a question of fact.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Statute: 18 U.S. C. § 1001 and the Materiality Question
Section 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and wilfully fal-
7. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
8. Id. at 298-99.
9. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
10. Id. at 361-64. See infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Winship rule.
11. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also infra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Winship rule. See also Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99.
12. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 79-134 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the source of the rule for each of the federal circuits.
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sifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.13
The statute proscribes both the concealing of material facts, and the
making of false representations within the jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment. 14 This statute was "designed 'to protect the authorized func-
tions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion
which might result from the deceptive practices described.' 15 Congress
enacted the statute over 100 years ago to penalize fraudulent monetary
claims against the government. 6 In 1934, Congress revised the statute to
reach non-monetary frauds. 1"
Section 1001 covers two distinct offenses."8 The first clause pros-
cribes concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of the federal gov-
ernment.1 9 This clause explicitly requires that a concealed fact be
"material" to constitute a violation of section 1001.20 To be material, a
fact must be capable of influencing or affecting a government function;2
however, the government does not actually have to be influenced.2" The
second clause of section 1001 covers false representations made within
the jurisdiction of the federal government.23 Every federal circuit except
the Second24 has grafted a materiality requirement onto the second
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
14. Id. See also United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 1983).
15. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096 (quoting United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92-93
(1941)).
16. United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-394, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996; United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 507 (1955).
18. United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1963).
19. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096. To convict a defendant under section 1001 for con-
cealment of a material fact, the government must prove the defendant had a duty to disclose
the material fact at the time of the alleged concealment. United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671,
678 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982). The duty to disclose usually arises
from a statute, government regulation, or form. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096.
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). See also United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375, 377 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880 (1956).
21. United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Bella v. United States, 447 U.S. 907 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096.
24. The Second Circuit concluded that no proof of the materiality of a false representation
is required for a conviction under section 1001. Silver, 235 F.2d at 377. The Second Circuit
based this decision on two factors. First, unlike the first clause of section 1001, which explic-
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clause of section 1001.25
Courts add the materiality requirement to section 1001 for two rea-
sons. First, the statute is couched in very broad terms. 26 Therefore,
courts require that false statements be material to ensure that trivial
falsehoods are not prosecuted under section 1001.27
Second, the courts hold, the statute was intended to protect govern-
ment functions from the exploitation that might result from false state-
ments.2" No exploitation of government functions could result, the
courts reason, from a false statement that is not capable of influencing a
government agency's decision.29 Thus, the courts conclude, the legisla-
tive purpose was to proscribe only material false statements.3 °
The circuits are split as to who should decide whether a concealed
fact or false representation is material. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
hold that the question is one of fact and should be decided by the trier of
fact.31 All other circuits conclude that the materiality question is one of
law and should therefore be decided by the court.3 2 The United States
itly covers the concealment of a "material fact," the second clause contains no such materiality
requirement. Id. Thus, the Second Circuit stated that "[w]e suggest that it is of doubtful
wisdom, not to say potentially dangerous, to import conditions into a penal statute which
appear to have been studiously omitted by the lawmakers themselves." Id. Second, the court
held that although the prohibition of the concealment of facts could be limited to the conceal-
ment of material facts, all false statements should be punished because even an immaterial false
statement could interfere with an investigation into fraud upon the government. Id.
25. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley,
786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359,
1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936
(1979); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975); Freidus v. United States, 223
F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
26. Beer, 518 F.2d at 170.
27. Id. at 170-71.
28. Friedus, 223 F.2d at 601. For example, in United States v. Valdez, the defendants were
convicted under section 1001 for preparing false employment letters which were submitted to
the United States Consular authorities by Mexican aliens seeking immigrant visas to enter the
United States. 594 F.2d 725, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1979). Similarly, in United States v. Abadi, the
appellant was convicted of violating section 1001 because he submitted fraudulent medical bills
to the Medicaid program. 706 F.2d 178, 179 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Freidus, 223 F.2d at 601-02.
30. See, e.g., id. at 601.
31. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 n.8 (Tenth Circuit); Valdez, 594 F.2d at 729 (Ninth Circuit).
32. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31 n.3 (First Circuit); Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327 (Seventh Cir-
cuit); Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (Third Circuit); Lopez, 728 F.2d at 1362 n.4 (Eleventh Circuit);
Abadi, 706 F.2d at 180 (Sixth Circuit); United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.4 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bernard,
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Supreme Court has refused to settle the controversy.33
B. Inconsistent Supreme Court Precedent
To understand this conflict, it is necessary to examine two distinct
lines of Supreme Court cases and how they converge on the section 1001
materiality question.
1. The Sinclair line of cases: materiality is a question of law
The first line of cases evolved from Sinclair v. United States.34 In
Sinclair, the defendant was convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 19211 be-
cause he refused to answer questions of a senate committee investigating
the Teapot Dome scandal.36 To sustain a conviction under section 192,
the question the defendant refused to answer had to be pertinent to the
issue the committee was investigating.37 On appeal the defendant argued
that the trial court had erred in deciding the issue of pertinency as a
question of law, instead of submitting it to the jury.3"
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.39 The
Court analogized pertinency to the questions of relevancy and material-
ity.' ° The Court stated that materiality, as an element of perjury, is a
question of law.4" Similarly, the Court stated that relevancy was tradi-
tionally a question of law.42 The Court reasoned that because materiality
and relevancy were questions of law, it would be "incongruous" to leave
the question of pertinency to the jury.43
384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
33. Greber v. United States, 474 U.S. 988 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
34. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
35. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1928) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either
House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under
inquiry before either House [of Congress], .. . willfully makes default, or who, having
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one
month nor more than twelve months.
Id.
36. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 284, 288.
37. Id. at 284-85 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1928)).
38. Id. at 291.
39. Id. at 299.
40. Id. at 298-99.
41. Id. at 298.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 298-99.
The question of pertinency under section 1[9]2 was rightly decided by the court as
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Recently, in Kungys v. United States,' the Supreme Court reiterated
Sinclair dicta that "'the materiality of what is falsely sworn, when an
element in the crime of perjury, is one for the court.' ",u In Kungys, the
petitioner had applied for a visa to immigrate to the United States.46 The
visa was issued in 1948, and Mr. Kungys came to the United States.47
He was naturalized as a United States citizen in 1954.48 In 1982, the
United States Justice Department filed a complaint pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451,'9 to denaturalize and deport Mr. Kungys.50 The complaint al-
leged that, in his visa application, Mr. Kungys gave false information
regarding his date and place of birth, his wartime occupation, and his
wartime residence. 1 Although the trial court found that Kungys made
these false representations, it held they were not material within the
meaning of section 1451(a).5 Therefore, the trial court entered judg-
ment for Mr. Kungys5 3 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
one of law. It did not depend upon the probative value of evidence. That question
may be likened to those concerning relevancy at the trial of issues in court, and it is
not essentially different from the question as to materiality of false testimony charged
as perjury in prosecutions for that crime. Upon reasons so well known that their
repetition is unnecessary it is uniformly held that relevancy is a question of law. And
the materiality of what is falsely sworn, when an element in the crime of perjury, is
one for the court.
The reasons for holding relevancy and materiality to be questions of law in cases
such as those above referred to apply with equal force to the determination of perti-
nency arising under section 1[9]2. The matter for determination in this case was
whether the facts called for by the question were so related to the subjects covered by
the Senate's resolutions that such facts reasonably could be said to be "pertinent to
the question under inquiry." It would be incongruous and contrary to well-estab-
lished principles to leave the determination of such a matter to a jury.
Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also cited three cases for the proposition that
materiality is a question of law. Id. at 298 (citing Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927); United States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892);
Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541 (1860)).
44. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
45. Id. at 772 (quoting Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929)).
46. Id. at 764.
47. Id
48. Id
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988). Section 1451(a) provides:
(a) It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts, upon
affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings ... for the purpose of
revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and cancel-
ling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of
naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a material
fact or by willful misrepresentation ....
Id.
50. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 764.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 764-65.
53. Id. at 766 (citing United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 793
F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)).
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the trial court and found that Mr. Kungys' misrepresentations regarding
the date and place of his birth were material under section 1451(a).54
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held
that Mr. Kungys' misrepresentations were not material."
The Court also considered whether materiality under section
1451(a) is an issue of law, which the Court itself could decide, or one of
fact, which had to be decided by the trial court.56 In deciding that the
question was one of law, the Court cited Sinclair for the proposition that
the issue of the materiality of a false representation, when an element of a
perjury offense, is a question of law. 7 Moreover, the Court analogized
materiality under section 1451(a) to materiality under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.58 The Court quoted a Sixth Circuit opinion that materiality
under section 1001 was a question of law because the materiality of a
false statement had to be determined through interpretation of substan-
tive law.59
2. In re Winship: every element of a crime must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact
In In re Winship," the Supreme Court held "that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged."61 In Winship, a judge in an adjudicatory hearing
found that a twelve year-old boy had stolen $112 from a woman's
pocket-book.6 The judge admitted that he was not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the juvenile had stolen the money; however, he
54. United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516, 533 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
The Third Circuit stated: "[Had [Kungys] told the truth at the time he applied for his citizen-
ship, the discrepancies between the truth and his visa materials would have resulted in either a
field investigation or an outright denial of the petition." Id.
55. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 774. The Court stated: "[W]hat is relevant is what would have
ensued from official knowledge of the misrepresented fact (in this case Kungys' true date and
place of birth), not what would have ensued from official knowledge of inconsistency between a
posited assertion of the truth and an earlier assertion of falsehood." Id. at 775.
56. Id. at 772.
57. Id. (citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929)).
58. Id. (citing United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
821 (1983)).
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821
(1983)). For a discussion of the impact of the Court's statement that materiality under section
1001 is a question of law, and of its use of Abadi to support that proposition, see infra notes
268-78 and accompanying text.
60. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. Id. at 364.
62. Id. at 359-60.
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was convinced by a preponderance of the evidence.6 3 This decision was
affirmed by both the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court
of Appeals.' 4
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine
whether the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution re-
quired that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.65 The Court con-
cluded that the reasonable-doubt standard was constitutionally
mandated for a number of reasons.66 First, the Court observed the re-
quirement that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt dated back
to the early years of the United States, and was almost unanimously ac-
cepted in common-law jurisdictions.67 Second, the Court defended the
standard's importance as a means of reducing the risk of erroneous con-
victions.6" Similarly, the Court reasoned the standard provided sub-
stance to the foundational "presumption of innocence."6 9 Third, the
Court concluded that requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt ex-
pressed a value judgment of our society-that the cost of the unavoidable
factual errors in the criminal justice system should not be born by the
defendant.70 Fourth, the Court asserted that the reasonable doubt stan-
63. Id. at 360. At that time, New York state law required facts at an adjudicatory hearing
to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 744(b)
(McKinney 1983)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 361.
66. Id. at 362.
67. Id. at 361.
68. Id. at 363. The Court stated that:
"Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government
has borne the burden of... convincing the factfinder of his guilt." To this end, the
reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the
necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."
Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 26 (No. 4 1967)).
69. Id. at 363.
70. Id. at 363-64. The Court noted:
"There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of * * *
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt ...
Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, I FAM.
L.Q. 1, 26 (No. 4 1967)).
Justice Harlan stated in his Winship concurrence that:
[T]he trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be wrong in his factual
conclusions. In a lawsuit between two parties, a factual error can make a difference
in one of two ways. First, it can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when
the true facts warrant a judgment for the defendant. The analogue in a criminal case
would be the conviction of an innocent man. On the other hand, an erroneous fac-
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dard was necessary to ensure the public's respect for the legal system.71
The Court, reversing the New York Court of Appeals, held that the rea-
sonable doubt standard is required during the adjudicatory stage of a
delinquency proceeding.72
Subsequently, the Court interpreted Winship, and due process, to
require every "element" of a criminal offense be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt to the trier of fact.7 3 Although Winship dealt with the due
process requirements in a state court proceeding, it is also the decisive
case on the burden of proof in federal prosecutions.74
In summary, Winship requires every element of a criminal offense be
tual determination can result in a judgment for the defendant when the true facts
justify a judgment in the plaintiff's favor. The criminal analogue would be the ac-
quittal of a guilty man.
Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two
types of erroneous outcomes, the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular
kind of litigation should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative
social disutility of each ....
In a criminal case. . . we do not view the social disutility of convicting an
innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty....
In this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a
criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.
Id. at 370-72 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 364. The standard is required, the Court said, to assure the public that innocent
people are not being condemned, and to assure any given individual that the government may
not convict him or her of a crime without convincing the properfactfinders beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id.
72. Id. at 368.
73. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)). The Jackson Court stated:
Winship presupposes as an essential of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction
except upon sufficient proof-defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.
Id. at 316. Similarly, in both Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) and Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the Court stated that "the Fourteenth Amendmen[t] require[s] that
the state prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt" (citations omit-
ted). Francis, 471 U.S. at 309 (quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512 (1979)). The
Court recently summarized this area of law:
A defendant charged with a serious crime has the right to have a jury determine
his guilt or innocence, and a jury's verdict cannot stand if the instructions provided
the jury do not require it to find each element of the crime under the proper standard
of proof. Findings made by a judge cannot cure deficiencies in the jury's finding as to
the guilt or innocence of a defendant resulting from the court's failure to instruct it to
find an element of the crime.
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1986) (citations omitted).
74. United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp. 828, 830 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Therefore, this
Comment refers to the Winship rule as the requirement that every element of a criminal offense
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. Id. ("For simplicity the court
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt, to the trier of fact.75 Since material-
ity is arguably an element of a section 1001 offense,76 it must presumably
be proven to the trier of fact. However, Sinclair requires a court to de-
cide materiality as a question of law.77 Thus, the cases are in conflict-
whether a false statement or a concealed fact is material cannot be de-
cided by the court as a matter of law and also be decided by the trier of
fact.
78
C. The Different Approaches of the Federal Circuit Courts in
Determining Materiality Under Section 1001
The federal circuit courts have treated the conflict between Sinclair
v. United States79 and In re Winship8" in at least four different ways.
First, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have required that materiality be
proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the trier of fact.81 Second, the
Sixth Circuit treats materiality as a question of law and does not consider
materiality to be an "element" of an offense as "element" is used in Win-
ship.8" Thus, according to the Sixth Circuit, the Sinclair and Winship
rules do not conflict. 83 Third, the Seventh Circuit considers materiality
an "essential element" of a section 1001 offense;84 nonetheless, it treats
shall refer to Winship as shorthand for the defendant's argument that materiality is an element
of perjury that must be determined by the jury").
Winship itself implicitly requires that elements must be proven to the trier of fact, because
the reasonable doubt standard cannot apply to a question of law. United States v. Hausmann,
711 F.2d 615, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1983) (evidentiary or factual burdens do not apply to questions
of law).
75. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
76. See infra notes 150-228 and accompanying text.
77. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298.
78. Materiality cannot be decided as both a question of fact and a question of law for two
reasons. First, "'as a question of law, there cannot appropriately be any evidentiary or factual
burden with respect to the issue of materiality. A question of law is by definition susceptible of
only two answers: 'yes,' the requirements of legal principles are met or 'no,' they are not
met.'" Hausmann, 711 F.2d at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198, 1202
(7th Cir. 1980)). Second, the trier of fact in a criminal case is often a jury. See, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.
1979). If the jury decides the materiality question, the judge cannot also decide it.
79. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
80. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
81. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 n.8; Valdez, 594 F.2d at 729.
82. An element in the Winship sense is "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which [the defendant] is charged." Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
83. United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
84. United States v. Brantley, 786"F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908
(1986).
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materiality as a question of law. 5 That court considers materiality an
exception to the general rule that the existence of every element of a
criminal offense be decided by the trier of fact.16 Finally, a number of
circuits simply follow the Sinclair rule that materiality is a question of
law,8 7 without even considering the impact of Winship."8 The next four
subsections discuss these four approaches to the section 1001 materiality
question.
1. The Ninth and Tenth Circuit approach-materiality as an element
is a jury question
In United States v. Valdez, 9 the Ninth Circuit announced that sec-
tion 1001's materiality requirement should be decided by the trier of
fact.90 In Valdez, the appellants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.91 They had prepared false employment letters for Mexican aliens
who then used the letters to obtain immigration visas from the United
States Consulate.92 On appeal, the appellants claimed that the district
court had erred in treating the false statements' materiality as a question
of law93 and argued that the issue of materiality should have been sub-
mitted to the jury.94
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the appellants' contention, stating:
"Since it is an essential element, materiality, as with all other elements of
the offense charged, must be determined by the jury."95 However, the
court held that in view of the overwhelming evidence of the materiality
of the appellants' false statements, the district court's failure to submit
85. Id. at 1327.
86. Id.
87. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99; see also supra notes 34-59 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Sinclair.
88. See United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Greber,
760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d
1359, 1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d
113, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v.
United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying
text for a discussion of cases following Sinclair, without any additional reasoning, and which
treat materiality as a question of law.
89. 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 729.
91. Id. at 727.
92. Id. The letters purported to offer the aliens jobs in the United States. Id. at 728.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 729.
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the issue of materiality to the jury was harmless error.9 6
In United States v. Irwin,97 the Tenth Circuit held that "materiality
is a factual question to be submitted to the jury with proper instructions
like other essential elements of the offense." 98 In Irwin, the City of Delta
hired Management Services Company (MSC), a trade name used by
James Irwin,99 as a consultant to help the City obtain federal funds to
finance the development of an industrial park."X In the grant applica-
tion, Irwin falsely stated that MSC received no compensation from the
City for completing the application. 101 Irwin was convicted of violating
section 1001 because he wilfully made a material false representation
within the jurisdiction of the federal government.'0 2
Irwin argued to the Tenth Circuit that the trial court had erred in
submitting the materiality question to the jury.' 3 However, the Tenth
Circuit found that he had requested jury instructions on the question of
materiality and had not objected to submission of that issue to the
jury."° The court of appeals concluded that Irwin could not object to an
alleged error that he invited.' 5 The Tenth Circuit also announced its
general rule-that materiality was a question of fact which had to be
submitted to a jury.'1 6
96. Id. According to the Ninth Circuit, the letters were clearly material since an alien
cannot receive a visa unless he or she is not likely to become a public charge. Id.
97. 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
98. Id. at 677 n.8.
99. Id. at 674.
100. Id. Irwin was hired as a "grantsman." He was to research which grants were avail-
able to the city and do whatever was necessary to obtain the government funds. Id. at 674 n.4.
101. Id. at 675.
102. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988)).
103. Id. at 673.
104. Id. at 677.
105. Id. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that testimony at trial established the material-
ity of the false statement because it showed that if Irwin had admitted he was being paid the
government would have investigated the application. Id. at 678.
106. Id. at 677 n.8.
Defendant argues that the majority rule is that materiality is a question of law for the
court in prosecutions under § 1001, citing United States v. Haynie, 568 F.2d 1091
(5th Cir.); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.); United States v. Bernard,
384 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.) and United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 953 .... and that the trial court erred here in submitting the issue to the
jury. We are not persuaded that our procedure is wrong and remain convinced that
materiality is a factual question to be submitted to the jury with proper instructions
like other essential elements of the offense, unless the court rules, as a matter of law,
that no submissible case is made out by the Government on the issue of materiality.
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2. The Sixth Circuit approach-because materiality is not an element
Winship does not apply
In United States v. Abadi, 07 the Sixth Circuit decided that material-
ity under section 1001 should be decided by the court as a question of
law."0 8 Dr. Abadi was convicted under section 1001 for submitting
fraudulent bills to the Medicaid program.10 9 On appeal, Abadi argued
that he had been denied his right to a jury trial because the district court
decided that his false statements were material, instead of submitting the
materiality question to the jury.
110
The Sixth Circuit stated that, although materiality rests on a factual
showing, the ultimate determination turns on the interpretation of sub-
stantive law."' Since the court is the interpreter of substantive law, a
court must decide the materiality of a false statement.1 12 Moreover, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that Winship did not require that materiality be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact because the materi-
ality of a false statement was not an element of a crime charged under the
second clause of section 1001.113 Rather, said the Sixth Circuit, the ma-
teriality requirement was a judicially created device to limit application
of section 1001.114
3. The Seventh Circuit approach-materiality is an exception to the
general rule that every element must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to the trier of fact
In United States v. Brantley,115 the Seventh Circuit held that materi-
ality should be decided by the court as a question of law.116 In Brantley,
the appellant was co-founder and president of a community youth organ-
ization." 7 The appellant coerced some of his employees into lying on
107. 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
108. Id. at 180.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id. Abadi also claimed: 1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; 2)
his case was prejudiced by remarks made by the government attorney; and 3) the trial judge
abused her discretion by admitting evidence that suggested the appellant had violated federal
narcotics laws. Id.
111. Id. at 180.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 180 n.2.
114. Id This method of distinguishing Winship applies only to the second clause of section
1001 because the first clause explicitly requires that any concealed fact prosecuted under the
statute be material. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
115. 786 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986).
116. Id. at 1327.
117. Id. at 1324.
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applications for a government-assisted on-the-job training program.1 18
Under the training program, federal funds were used to reimburse em-
ployers for fifty percent of the cost of training applicants.1 19 The Secre-
tary of Labor allocated the funds to prime sponsors of the program
whose applications had been approved by a regional administrator. 2 '
Thus, any false statements that could cause funds to be disbursed were
capable of influencing a federal agency and were material. 121 Because the
applicants were not actually eligible for the program, the trial court held
that their statements were material, 12 2 and the jury convicted the appel-
lant of violating section 1001.123
On appeal, the appellant argued that the materiality question should
have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact. 124 The Seventh
Circuit concluded that although materiality was an essential element of a
section 1001 offense, it was nonetheless a question of law. 125 First, the
court noted, Sinclair held that the materiality of perjured statements was
a question of law. 126 Second, the court observed that Sinclair was still
good law.'27 Third, the court stated that the majority of the circuits con-
sider the materiality question under section 1001 to be a question of
law. 2 ' Therefore, the court reasoned, since the Supreme Court and the
majority of federal circuit courts consider materiality to be a question of
law, the materiality question must be an exception to the general rule
118. Id. at 1325-26.
119. Id. at 1325 n.1 (citing Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 801-999, repealed by Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, § 184(a), 96 Stat.
1322, 1357-58 (1982)).
120. Id. at 1326 (citing Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-
999, repealed by Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, § 184(a), 96 Stat. 1322,
1357-58 (1982)).
121. Id. at 1327.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1326.
124. Id
125. Id. at 1327.
Despite the objections of Brantley, the trial court refused to submit the question of
materiality to the jury. In so doing, the trial court ruled consistently with the law in
this Circuit .... This exception to the general rule that the Government must prove
every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt evolved from Sinclair
v. United States .... The Sinclair Court held that the question as to materiality of
false testimony charged as perjury is a question of law.... Because Sinclair contin-
ues to be good law, and because the greater weight of authority is consistent with the
decision of the trial court, we persist in holding that materiality is a question of law
to be decided by the judge in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id. (citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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that the existence of each element is determined by the trier of fact.129
4. Federal circuit courts that ignore Winship and hold that
materiality is a question of law
The rest of the federal circuit courts of appeals treat the section 1001
materiality question as one of law. 13° The rule in these circuits, except in
the Eighth Circuit,1 3 1 is rooted in the Sinclair Court's statement that ma-
teriality is a question of law.1 32 That is, each circuit, except the Eighth
Circuit, supports its own rule with a cite to Sinclair, or a case that cites
to Sinclair.1 33  However, these circuits do not explicitly consider the im-
129. Id.
130. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Greber,
760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d
1359, 1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d
752, 758 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703
(D.C. Cir. 1956). See infra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule in
these circuits.
131. The source of the Eighth Circuit rule cannot be traced back to Sinclair, or any case
that addresses the issue of who should determine the materiality of a statement. Rather, it
resulted from a misreading of Ninth Circuit case law.
The Eighth Circuit rule-materiality is a question of law-is rooted in United States v.
East, 416 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1969). In East, the defendant was convicted under the false
statement clause of section 1001. Id. at 351-52. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court had erred in not instructing the jury that the defendant's statement needed to be material
to establish a violation of section 1001. Id. at 353. The Ninth Circuit stated: "The [trial]
court then did not fully or accurately inform the jury as to the elements of the offenses charged
in the indictment. No prejudice resulted, however, since under the circumstances of this case
the materiality of the representations was established as a matter of law." Id. at 355.
When the Eighth Circuit cited East in United States v. Jones, 464 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973), it subtly changed the meaning of the above quoted
phrase. The Jones Court cited East for the proposition that the materiality of a statement need
not be determined by the jury because "[tihese are legal issues and no prejudice resulted be-
cause [in Jones] the trial judge did not submit them to the jury." Jones, 464 F.2d at 1124
(citing United States v. East, 416 F.2d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1969)). A subsequent Eighth Circuit
case cited Jones for the proposition that "[t]he question of materiality of a false statement or
representation in § 1001 context is one of law. . . ." United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758
(8th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v. Jones, 464 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1111 (1973)). Thus, from the East court's holding that in that specific case,
the failure to submit the materiality question to the jury was not prejudicial, East, 416 F.2d at
355, came the Eighth Circuit rule that the section 1001 materiality question is one of law.
132. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
133. A. The First Circuit
The First Circuit explicitly rejected Valdez (materiality like all essential elements is de-
cided by the trier of fact) and instead chose to follow the majority rule. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31
n.3. The First Circuit cited to Abadi "and the case cited therein" to support treating the
materiality requirement of section 1001 as a question of law. Id. However, the First Circuit
did not indicate that it was accepting the reasoning of Abad- Id. Because the majority of the
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federal circuits that follow the majority rule do so because of Sinclair, it is likely that the First
Circuit rule is attributable to Sinclair rather than to Abadi.
B. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit rule is supported by United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963) and United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965).
United States v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967) (materiality should be decided by
court as question of law).
The Fourth Circuit in Ivey cited Sinclair, Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) and United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 365 U.S. 312
(1961), to support its holding that the materiality requirement of section 1001 was a question
of law. Ivey, 322 F.2d at 529. In Weinstock, the D.C. Circuit held that materiality under
section 1001 was a question of law, and the court cited Sinclair for this proposition. Wein-
stock, 231 F.2d at 703. In Clancy, the Seventh Circuit held that materiality under section 1001
was a question of law. 276 F.2d at 635. The Clancy court cited United States v. Parker, 244
F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957), and United States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29 (2d
Cir. 1957), to support its holding. Clancy, 276 F.2d at 635. The Parker Court relied on Sin-
clair in holding that the materiality question was one of law. 244 F.2d at 950 (citing Sinclair,
279 U.S. at 298-99). TheAlu court cited Sinclair, Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.
1927) cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927) and a number of other cases which are directly or
indirectly supported by Sinclair. Alu, 246 F.2d at 32. The Sinclair Court relied on Carroll in
holding that materiality was a question of law. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99. In addition to
relying on Sinclair and Carroll, the Alu court cited United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504 (3d
Cir. 1935), Dolan v. United States, 218 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955),
Travis v. United States, 123 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1941), and Harrell v. United States, 220 F.2d
516 (5th Cir. 1955).
In Slutzky, the Third Circuit relied exclusively on Sinclair for its holding that materiality
under 18 U.S.C. § 231 was a question of law. Slutzky, 79 F.2d at 506. Section 231 proscribes
the giving of false statements while under oath before a competent tribunal. 18 U.S.C. § 231
(1909) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988)).
In Dolan, the Eighth Circuit relied on Sinclair, Carroll, and United States v. Moran, 194
F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965 (1952) for the proposition that materiality under
18 U.S.C. § 1621 was a question of law. Dolan, 218 F.2d at 457. Section 1621 proscribes
giving false testimony under oath before a competent tribunal. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). The
Moran court cited Blackmon v. United States, 108 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1940), for the conclusion
that materiality was a question of law. In Blackmon, the Fifth Circuit cited Sinclair, Carroll,
and Slutzky for the proposition that materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 231 was a question of law.
Blackmon, 108 F.2d at 574.
In Travis, the Tenth Circuit cited Sinclair, Carroll, Slutzky, and Blackmon, for the state-
ment that the materiality question was for the court to decide. Travis, 123 F.2d at 270.
In Harrell, the Fifth Circuit cited Sinclair, Carroll, Slutzky, Moran, Travis, Blackmon and
United States v. Marachowsky, 201 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953) for the
rule that the materiality question under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 was a question of law for the court to
decide. Harrell, 220 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted). In Marachowsky, the Seventh Circuit
relied on Sinclair and Carroll in deciding that the materiality of perjured testimony is a ques-
tion of law. Marachowsky, 201 F.2d at 18.
The Marchisio court supported the rule that materiality is a question of law by citing Alu,
Carroll, and United States v. Siegel, 263 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
Marchisio, 344 F.2d at 665. The Siegel court's statement that materiality is a question of law is
supported with cites to Sinclair, Carroll, and Alu. Siegel, 263 F.2d at 533.
C. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit supported its rule by citing to Sinclair and the "majority of the Courts
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pact of Winship on the section 1001 materiality question.13 4
III. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM
In re Winship 135 requires the prosecution to prove every element of
a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact (Winship
rule). 136 The Court also stated, in Sinclair v. United States,137 and reiter-
ated in Kungys v. United States,13 that materiality should be decided by
the court as a question of law (Sinclair rule). 139 If the section 1001 mate-
riality requirement is an element of a section 1001 offense, then it is sub-
ject to both the Winship and Sinclair rules.1"° However, the Supreme
Court has not acted to resolve this conflict, and the federal circuits can-
not agree on who should determine materiality under section 1001.141
of Appeals." United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985) (materiality should be decided by court as question of law).
D. The Fourth Circuit
In Ivey, the Fourth Circuit held that the section 1001 materiality question is a question of
law. Ivey, 322 F.2d at 529. The fact that this holding is based on Sinclair is discussed supra, at
B.
E. The Fifth Circuit
In United States v. Krause, 507 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit held that
materiality under section 1001 was a question of law. Id. at 118-19. The court stated that the
majority of federal circuit courts treat materiality as a question of law. Id. at 118. The Fifth
Circuit cited Ivey and Weinstock for this proposition. Id.
F. The Eleventh Circuit
The rule in the Eleventh Circuit is supported by a cite to United States v. Lichenstein, 610
F.2d 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Bella v. United States, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). See
United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984).
Lichenstein is supported with a cite to Krause. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d at 1278.
G. The D.C. Circuit
In Weinstock, the D.C. Circuit stated that materiality under section 1001 is a question of
law. Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 703. The Weinstock court cited Sinclair for this statement. Id.
134. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31 n.3; Greber, 760 F.2d at 73; Lopez, 728 F.2d at 1362 n.4; Hicks,
619 F.2d at 758; Krause, 507 F.2d at 118-19; Bernard, 384 F.2d at 916; Ivey, 322 F.2d at 529;
Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 703. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rule in these circuits.
135. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
136. Id. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Winship.
137. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
138. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
139. Id. at 772; Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298.
140. If materiality is an element of a section 1001 offense then Winship requires that it be
proven to the trier of fact. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Winship. Moreover, even if materiality is an element, Sinclair
states that it should be decided as a question of law. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99.
141. Compare, eg., United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 n.8 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979) with,
e.g., United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (lst Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley,
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Thus, whether materiality must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to
the trier of fact, or merely established to the satisfaction of the court, 42
depends on where the defendant is brought to trial.
To determine which rule should control the section 1001 materiality
question, three interrelated issues must be resolved. First, is materiality
an element? Second, if materiality is an element, is the Sinclair rule an
exception to the general rule that elements must be decided by the trier of
fact? Third, although the rationale of Sinclair does not justify treating it
as an exception to the Winship rule, does Kungys 14 3 nonetheless require
that materiality be decided as a question of law?
IV. ANALYSIS
This section proposes that materiality is an element of a section 1001
offense and therefore, In re Winship " applies to the section 1001 materi-
ality question. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit is incorrect in asserting
that because Winship does not apply to the section 1001 materiality ques-
tion the Due Process Clause does not require that materiality be proven
to the trier of fact."14 Next, this Comment maintains that the rationales
of Sinclair v. United States "6 cannot justify treating the Sinclair rule as
an exception to Winship. Under this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit 4 7
should not follow Sinclair. Similarly, if Winship applies to the section
1001 materiality question, and Sinclair is not an exception to the Winship
rule, then the circuits which follow Sinclair without considering Winship
are in error. 1 4  Therefore, only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits employ a
786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359,
1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178,
180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758 (8th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bernard,
384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
142. If materiality is decided as a question of law the reasonable-doubt standard does not
apply. United States v. Hausmann, 711 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir. 1983). See Winship, 397 U.S.
at 361-64 for the United States Supreme Court's discussion of the benefits of the reasonable-
doubt standard. See also supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
reasonable-doubt standard.
143. See supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kungys.
144. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
145. United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821
(1983).
146. 279 U.S. 263 (1929). For a discussion of these rationales, see infra notes 229-78 and
accompanying text.
147. United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908
(1986).
148. See United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (lst Cir. 1987); United States v.
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constitutionally permissible approach to the section 1001 materiality
question because they follow Winship and require that materiality be
proven to the trier of fact. 149
A. Materiality is an Element
The Winship rule requires that all elements of a criminal offense be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. 150 In order to
determine whether that rule applies to the question of materiality under
section 1001, it must first be determined whether materiality is an ele-
ment of a section 1001 offense.
1. Materiality meets the Winship criteria for
what constitutes an element
The Winship Court stated:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof [to the 'proper factfinder'] beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.51
The section 1001 materiality question fits this description of ele-
ments that must be proven to the trier of fact. First, under the statute,
proof of materiality is necessary to establish a violation.152 Second, ma-
teriality is often a factual determination, rather than one of law.' 53 A
Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez,
728 F.2d 1359, 1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Krause,
507 F.2d 113, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir.
1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963);
Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See supra note 133 for a
discussion of cases following Sinclair without any additional reasoning, and treating material-
ity as a question of law.
149. United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 n.8 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979).
150. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See also supra notes 60-74 for a discussion of
the Winship rule.
151. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364; United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp. 828, 830 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988); see also, eg., United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 170-71
(5th Cir. 1975) (courts read materiality requirement into second clause of section 1001).
153. See United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825
(1985); Beer, 518 F.2d at 170-72. See infra notes 156-82 for a discussion of these cases. See
also United States v. Lueben, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Corsino, 812
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828
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statement or concealed fact is material if it is capable of influencing the
outcome of a governmental department or agency decision.154 Whether
a false statement or concealed fact is capable of influencing a decision
often turns on evidence of whether the decision maker was influenced,
and not on the interpretation of substantive law. 55
For example, in United States v. Swaim,156 the appellant was con-
victed of violating section 1001.157 There, appellant sought to borrow
$2,225,000 from the North Mississippi Savings and Loan Association
(Association) to purchase a home worth $1,600,000 and then convert the
remaining $625,000.158 However, the Association could not lend an
amount in excess of eighty percent of the purchase price of the home."5 9
Therefore, the appellant concealed its true purchase price.
1 60
At trial, the prosecution called the vice-president of the Federal
Home Loan Bank to testify about the materiality of the concealed fact. 161
The vice-president testified that federal regulations required that home
loans by savings and loan institutions not exceed a certain percentage of
the value of the home.' 62 He also testified that the reported purchase
price of a home was "material" to his agency's determination of whether
the loan should be made.'6  Finally, the vice-president testified that if
the loan were not sound, the purchase price was material to determining
the effect of the loan on the financial solvency of the lending institu-
tion."6 On appeal, the appellant argued that "the testimony produced
by the prosecution at trial [was] insufficient to support a finding by any
factfinder that the purchase price was a material fact."'' 6 s However, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the vice-president's testimony had estab-
(1984); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1980). See infra note 182 for informa-
tion on these cases.
154. Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
155. See infra notes 156-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual nature of
the section 1001 materiality question.
156. 757 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
157. Id. at 1532.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Although the evidence would have also supported a conviction for submitting false
statements in violation of section 1001, the indictment properly charged the appellant with
concealment since there was "'an affirmative act by which means a material fact [was] con-
cealed.'" Id. at 1536 (quoting United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1977)).
161. Id. at 1535.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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lished the materiality of the concealed fact.I6 6
Similarly, in United States v. Beer,167 the appellant was president of
the Venice-Nokomis Bank and Trust Company. 1 68  There, the bank
loaned money to a friend of the appellant for the purchase of an airplane
in which the appellant would have a one-half interest.' 69 The appellant
was not shown as an obligor on the loan.'17  The Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) conducted a routine examination of the Ven-
ice-Nokomis Bank and asked the appellant to fill out an Officer's
Questionnaire. 17 ' The appellant falsely answered "none" to the question,
"List all extensions of credit made... for accommodation of others than
those whose names appear on [bank] records .... ,17 At trial, the only
evidence of the materiality of the appellant's statement was the testimony
of a bank examiner for the FDIC.173 He testified that the FDIC relied on
the information provided by the questionnaire because such information
was not otherwise found in bank records. 74 The appellant was subse-
quently convicted of violating section 1001 for falsely representing that
he was not accommodated by a loan from the Venice-Nokomis Bank.
17
The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court and held that the showing
of the potential effects of the false statement was insufficient.' 76 The ap-
pellate court stated that in order to determine materiality, it needed to
know what the FDIC would have done with information in the question-
naire had the information been accurate. 177 Moreover, the court needed
to know how the inaccurate information impaired the FDIC's func-
tions. 178 The court stated that "[flrom the evidence in this record we
cannot answer these questions with that degree of certainty sufficient to
166. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated: "According to this testimony, the concealment of the
true purchase price of the building would 'have the capacity to impair or prevent the function-
ing of a governmental agency."' Id. (quoting United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272,
1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bella v. United States, 447 U.S. 907 (1980)). Thus, the
concealed fact satisfied the Fifth Circuit's definition of materiality, a definition established in
United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1278 (5th Cir. 1980).
167. 518 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1975).
168. Id. at 169.
169. Id.
170. Id. The appellant and his friend already owned one plane and used it to visit the
appellant's family. They intended to acquire a larger and faster plane for this purpose. Id.
171. Id. at 170.
172. Id. at 169.
173. Id. at 170. The testimony did not indicate how the false statement affected the FDIC,
but did reveal that it did not warrant cancellation of the bank's insurance by the FDIC. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 172.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court noted that soon after the false statement was made, the loan was repaid.
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justify a felony conviction under the terms of the statute."' 79
It appears in Swaim that the materiality question turned entirely on
evidence adduced at trial, and not on the interpretation of substantive
law. Testimony at trial revealed that the concealed fact had the capacity
to affect a government agency's function and was, therefore, material. 8 '
Similarly, in Beer, the Fifth Circuit reversed the appellant's conviction
because there was not enough factual evidence adduced at trial to sup-
port conviction. 181 There are many other examples of cases where the
answer to the materiality question turned on the facts adduced at trial.182
Materiality should thus be seen as a fact that must be proven to consti-
tute a violation of section 1001.
2. A substantial majority of the federal circuits consider materiality
an essential element of a section 1001 offense
Most federal circuits consider materiality to be an "essential ele-
ment" of a section 1001 offense.' 3 Accordingly, two of these circuits
hold that because materiality is an essential element, it must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. 184 Nonetheless, most of
the circuits which consider materiality an essential element, also treat the
section 1001 materiality requirement as a question of law.'85
Therefore, the court needed to know what the FDIC would have done had it learned of the
accommodation from the questionnaire if the loan was in fact questionably collateralized. Id.
179. Id.
180. Swaim, 757 F.2d at 1535.
181. Beer, 518 F.2d at 172.
182. See Lueben, 816 F.2d at 1033 (trial court must consider testimony of expert witnesses
in deterufiining materiality); Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31 (evidence adduced at trial showed that
appellant intended to influence investigation; therefore, appellant's false statements were mate-
rial); Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (evidence adduced at trial showed appellant's false statements
allowed payments on his false claims; thus, his false statements were material); Lopez, 728 F.2d
at 1362-63 (Eleventh Circuit considered how falsehood influenced and inconvenienced agency,
in determining materiality); Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 n.8 (materiality is factual question); Adler,
623 F.2d at 1292 n.8 (McMillian, J.) ("The question of materiality in a fraud type case like
this proceeding is the factual tendency of the alleged fraud to induce action by the govern-
ment. . . ."). The two other judges responsible for the Adler decision did not join in Judge
McMillian's comments regarding the nature of the materiality question. Id.
183. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 30 (First Circuit); United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1326
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (Third Circuit); Irwin, 654
F.2d at 676 (Tenth Circuit); United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346,
349 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 602
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
184. Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 n.8; Valdez, 594 F.2d at 729. See supra notes 89-106 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of both of these cases.
185. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 31 n.3; Greber, 760 F.2d at 73; Baker, 626 F.2d at 514 n.4; United
States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1980); Freidus, 223 F.2d at 602.
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Initially, the fact that these circuits treat materiality as a question of
law seems inconsistent with considering materiality to be an "element" of
a section 1001 offense, since the Winship rule requires that elements be
proven to the trier of fact."8 6 However, the rule in each of these circuits
can be traced to Sinclair v. United States.l" 7 These circuits may have
reasoned that the Sinclair Court made materiality an exception to the
Winship rule."' 8 The Winship rule needs no exception if it does not ap-
ply, and the Winship rule does not apply unless materiality is an element.
Therefore, the fact that these circuits treat materiality as a question of
law should not reflect negatively on materiality's status as an element.
3. The fact that materiality is not explicitly stated in the second
clause of section 1001 does not preclude it from being an
element of a false statement offense
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the Due Process
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defend-
ant is charged." ' 9 However, this statement, initially made in Patterson
v. New York 19 and repeated in McMillan v. Pennsylvania,19 does not
limit the application of Winship to the statutorily defined elements of a
crime. 192 The rationales of both Patterson and McMillan should not be
seen as limiting Winship's applicability to the section 1001 materiality
question.
In Patterson, the petitioner was convicted of murder under a New
York statute that required proof of intent to kill and also permitted the
186. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 for a discussion of Winship.
187. 279 U.S. 263 (1929); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text for an illustration
of how the rules in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits can be
traced to Sinclair. The rule in the Seventh Circuit is also based on Sinclair. See Brantley, 786
F.2d at 1327. The Eighth Circuit rule does not evolve directly from Sinclair, but rather from a
misreading of Ninth Circuit case law. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. However, a
later Eighth Circuit case cited United States v. Schaffer, 600 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1979) for the
rule that materiality is a question of law. Adler, 623 F.2d at 1292. Schaffer follows the Fifth
Circuit rule which is itself traceable to Sinclair. Schaffer, 600 F.2d at 1123.
188. This is exactly what the Seventh Circuit said. The court stated that materiality is an
essential element, but that Sinclair created an exception to the rule that every element must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327. See also United States v.
Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1983) (materiality is exception to Winship require-
ment that every element be proven beyond reasonable doubt).
189. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 210 (1977).
190. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
191. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
192. See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
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defendant to raise the affirmative defense of acting under extreme emo-
tional disturbance.'93 Before the United States Supreme Court, the peti-
tioner argued that allocating the burden of proof to the defendant on the
issue of extreme emotional disturbance violated his right under the Due
Process Clause to require that the prosecution establish every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.' 94 The Court rejected the peti-
tioner's arguments and affirmed his conviction because, it concluded,
proof of the absence of extreme emotional disturbance was not necessary
for a conviction under the statute.' 95 Furthermore, the Court recognized
the state's paramount interest in the administration of criminal justice
and was therefore reluctant to add an element to the statutorily defined
offense. '
96
In McMillan, the petitioners were convicted of various crimes rang-
ing from robbery to voluntary manslaughter. '" Pennsylvania's
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act required a minimum sentence of
five years if the state showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
firearm was used in the commission of the crimes.' 98 However, the peti-
tioners' sentencing judges refused to consider whether the petitioners had
used firearms in committing their offenses because each judge found the
Act to be unconstitutional. 99 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania re-
versed.2°" The petitioners then argued to the United States Supreme
Court that if a state wants to punish the possession of a firearm, the state
must prove such possession beyond a reasonable doubt.2°0 The Court
193. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975)).
194. Id. at 200-01.
195. Id at 205-06.
196. Id. at 201-02. The Court stated:
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, and that we should not
lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice
by the individual States. Among other things, it is normally "within the power of the
State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the bur-
den of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion," and its decision in this
regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless "it offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.
Id. (citations omitted).
197. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.
198. Id. at 81.
199. Id. at 82.
200. Id. at 83.
201. Id. at 83-84. The petitioners argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause
as interpreted in Winship and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). McMillan, 477 U.S. at
84. In Mullaney, the petitioner was convicted of murder under a statute where all homocides
were punished as murder unless the defendant proved that he or she acted in the heat of
passion on sudden provocation, in which case the crime was reduced to manslaughter. Mulla-
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rejected the petitioners' argument, finding instead that possession of a
firearm was not an element.20 2 Rather, the Court concluded, possession
of a firearm was a sentencing factor that came into play after the defend-
ant had been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2°3 Moreover, the
Court stated, it was hesitant to interfere with the way states defined and
punished crime.2°
The Court's statements in Patterson and McMillan, that only those
elements listed in the statutory definition of a crime must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, 2 5 should not be construed to mean that Win-
ship does not apply to materiality under section 1001. First, section 1001
is a federal statute and therefore the statutory definition of the crime is
not entitled to the deference the Court gave to the state statutes in Patter-
son and McMillan.2 "6 Second, the Court in McMillan and Patterson con-
cluded that the facts at issue, absence of extreme emotional disturbance
and use of a firearm, were not subject to the Winship rule because those
facts were not necessary for conviction under the state statutes.20 7 Con-
versely, most federal circuit courts require that the government establish
the materiality of a false statement to convict under section 1001.208
The Supreme Court in Patterson did not address what the standard
of proof would be if New York had to prove the absence of extreme
emotional distress. Similarly, the McMillan Court did not address what
the standard of proof would be if possession of a firearm were essential
for a conviction. Thus, the Court's reasoning in both Patterson and Mc-
Millan is not applicable to the section 1001 materiality question, and the
Court's statements in those cases that only legislatively defined elements
are subject to the reasonable doubt standard20 9 should not control.
ney, 421 U.S. at 691-92. However, the Court affirmed the First Circuit's reversal of the respon-
dent's conviction. Id. at 704. The Court reasoned that although the absence of malice was not
required for a conviction under the statute, it was nonetheless a fact that the prosecution had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 696-701. Therefore, the statute improperly shifted
the burden of persuasion from the prosecution to the defendant and violated the Due Process
Clause. Id.
202. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 85.
205. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85.
206. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86 (deference).
207. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-11; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86.
208. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 30 (First Circuit); Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327 (Seventh Circuit);
Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (Third Circuit); Lopez, 728 F.2d at 1362 (Eleventh Circuit); Abadi, 706
F.2d at 180 (Sixth Circuit); Irwin, 654 F.2d at 677 (Tenth Circuit); Voorhees, 593 F.2d at 349
(Eighth Circuit); Valdez, 594 F.2d at 728 (Ninth Circuit); Beer, 518 F.2d at 171 (Fifth Cir-
cuit); Freidus, 223 F.2d at 601 (D.C. Circuit).
209. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210; McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85.
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Other Supreme Court cases further support this conclusion.210 The
Court has concluded, on at least two occasions, that elements which it
has grafted onto federal statutes are, while not written into the relevant
statute, nonetheless subject to Winship.
211
In Morissette v. United States,21 2 the petitioner was convicted of con-
verting government property after he took used artillery casings from an
Air Force bombing range.213 At trial, the petitioner claimed that he
thought the property was abandoned; however, he was convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 641,214 which did not explicitly require proof of intent for
conviction.215 Upon conviction, the petitioner appealed and the court of
appeals affirmed the conviction.216 The United States Supreme Court re-
versed and held that section 641 required proof of intent for three rea-
sons: 1) intent was fundamental to culpability; 217 2) section 641 codified
common-law larceny which required proof of intent;218 and 3) the stat-
ute's requirement of a knowing conversion implied that it also required
an intentional conversion.21 9 Moreover, the Court stated, where intent
210. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). See also infra notes 211-28 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these cases.
211. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 446 (intent is element of criminal antitrust offense that must be
proven to the jury); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 274 (trial court's implying intent element into theft
statute and failure to instruct jury regarding element was error). Although neither of these
cases mentioned Winship, both held that intent is an element of a criminal offense and must be
proven to the jury. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 446; Morissette, 432 U.S. at 274.
212. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
213. Id. at 248-49.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988) states in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof,
or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any
department or agency thereof;
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Id.
215. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 248-49.
216. Id. at 249.
217. Id. at 250-51.
218. Id. at 260-62.
219. Id. at 270-71. The Court remarked:
Knowledge, of course, is not identical with intent and may not have been the most
apt words of limitation. But knowing conversion requires more than knowledge that
defendant was taking property into his possession. He must have knowledge of the
facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion. In the case
before us, whether the mental element that Congress required be spoken of as knowl-
edge or as intent, would not seem to alter its bearing on guilt.
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was an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence was a question of
fact that had to be proven to the trier of fact.22
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,221 the respondents,
several major gypsum-board manufacturers, were convicted of engaging
in a price-fixing conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.222 The respondents were found to have furthered the conspiracy
through "interseller price verification"-that is, they had telephoned
competing producers to find out the price on gypsum board currently
being offered to a particular customer.223  At trial, the court had in-
structed the jury that intent to fix prices was irrelevant, if the verifica-
tions had the effect of fixing prices.2 24  However, the United States
Supreme Court stated that intent was an essential element of the crime
charged, even though intent was not explicitly required by the Sherman
Act.225 Moreover, the Court stated that "ultimately the decision on the
issue of intent must be left to the trier of fact alone. ' 226 The Court disap-
proved of the jury instructions given by the trial court227 and affirmed the
Third Circuit's reversal of the respondent's conviction.228 These cases
demonstrate the Court's willingness to graft elements, notably that of
220. Id. at 274. In support of its holding that intent must be decided by the jury, the
Morissette Court stated:
"It is alike the general rule of law and the dictate of natural justice that to
constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention.
Under our system (unless in exceptional cases), both must be found by the jury to
justify a conviction for crime. However clear the proof may be, or however incontro-
vertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the ques-
tion of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted
to the jury. Jurors may be perverse; the ends of justice may be defeated by unright-
eous verdicts, but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one
responding to the law, the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the
other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury."
Id. (quoting People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (1891)).
221. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
222. Id. at 426-31.
223. Id. at 429.
224. Id. at 429-31. The trial court instructed the jury that:
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences
of his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to
raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a
matter of law, to have intended that result.
Id. at 430.
225. Id. at 443.
226. Id. at 446. Neither Gypsum nor Morissette cited Winship for the proposition that in-
tent had to be proven to the trier of fact because intent was an element of a crime. Nonethe-
less, both cases are consistent with Winship's requirement that all elements of a crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See
also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of Winship.
227. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 435-36.
228. Id. at 433-34.
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intent, onto various criminal statutes, and reflects the Court's insistence
that intent be proven to a trier of fact. This practice should be extended
to interpretation of the false statement clause of section 1001. That ma-
teriality is not explicitly required under this statute should not preclude
materiality from being an element of the offense which must be proven to
the trier of fact.
B. Sinclair Should Not Be an Exception to the Winship Rule
Both Sinclair v. United States229 and In re Winship 230 apply to the
section 1001 materiality question since Sinclair states materiality is a
question of law231 and Winship requires that all elements of a crime be
decided by the trier of fact.2 32 As previously mentioned, a majority of
the federal circuit courts follow Sinclair and hold that the materiality
question of section 1001 is a question of law. 233 Also as previously dis-
cussed, a minority of federal circuits follow Winship and require that ma-
teriality under section 1001 be proven to the trier of fact.2 34  The
question remains as to which rule controls issues of materiality under
section 1001.235
The Winship rule is based on the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.236 The Winship rule: (1) protects the innocent; (2)
229. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
230. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
231. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99.
232. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Winship.
233. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley,
786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359,
1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178,
180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.4
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir.
1956).
234. United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 n.8 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979).
235. See United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp. 828, 838 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In reference to
materiality and 18 U.S.C. § 1623, the Taylor Court stated:
The only substantial reason offered by the government for why Winship should not
apply to materiality is the great weight of Sinclair precedent. If that precedent stood
alone, the court would unquestionably be bound by it. However, because the
Supreme Court has also evolved the more recent Winship line of cases, this court
must do its best to determine whether the Supreme Court would consider that the
reasoning of those precedents can be harmonized, or that one of them must be viewed
as controlling.
Id.
236. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
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ensures that the prosecuting party bears the risk of erroneous factual de-
terminations; and, (3) ensures the public's respect for the legal system.237
These are compelling rationales. The Sinclair rule's rationale however, is
not compelling or constitutionally derived.238
The Sinclair Court supported the rule that materiality is a question
of law with an analogy to relevancy; 239 however, that analogy is
flawed. 4" The concept of "relevancy" concerns the admissibility of evi-
dence.24' Conversely, materiality as an element of an offense is an issue
upon which guilt or innocence depends.242 As the court stated in United
States v. Taylor,243 "A ruling by the court regarding evidence simply de-
termines what information a jury may consider in reaching its decision
regarding the elements of an offense; a ruling by the court regarding ma-
teriality precludes the jury from ever reaching a decision regarding that
element." 2' The concepts of materiality and relevancy should be viewed
as distinct.245 Therefore, comparing materiality to relevancy does not
firmly support the rule that materiality is a question of law.24 6
The Sinclair Court cited three cases for the proposition that materi-
ality must always be a question of law.247 However, these cases do not
firmly support the Sinclair rule. The first case the Court cited was Car-
roll v. United States.24 Carroll was a Prohibition-era case in which the
237. Id.
238. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
239. Id. at 298-99.
240. The Court's analogy has been criticized. See, eg., United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d
1317, 1323-24 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1292 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980);
Taylor, 693 F. Supp. at 839-40; Commonwealth v. McDufee, 379 Mass. 353, 361-62, 398
N.E.2d 463, 468 (1979).
241. Johnson, 718 F.2d at 1324.
242. Id. The Fifth Circuit has commented that "the comparability of a ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence, which is the sole question when relevancy is examined, and determining an
issue upon which guilt or innocence depends is not immediately obvious to us." Id.
243. 693 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
244. Id. at 839.
245. Johnson, 718 F.2d at 1324; Adler, 623 F.2d at 1292 n.8; Taylor, 693 F. Supp. at 839-40;
McDuffee, 379 Mass. at 361-62, 398 N.E.2d at 468. As the New York Supreme Court's Appel-
late Division stated, "materiality as a substantive element of the crime of perjury is something
more than materiality considered in an evidentiary ruling by the court. Materiality in such a
case becomes a matter for ultimate determination by the decisional process." People v. Cle-
mente, 285 A.D.2d 258, 262, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202, 206 (1954), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 890, 131 N.E.2d
294 (1955).
246. Adler, 623 F.2d at 1292 n.8; Taylor, 693 F. Supp. at 839-40; McDuffee, 379 Mass. at
361-62, 398 N.E.2d at 468.
247. Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298 (citing Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927); United States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892); Cothram v.
State, 39 Miss. 541 (1860)).
248. 16 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
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appellant lied to a grand jury about whether he had served alcohol at a
party.249 The trial court decided that the appellant's false statements to
the grand jury were material and the jury found him guilty of perjury.2 50
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the appellant argued that the trial
court had erred in considering the statements' materiality as a question
of law rather than submitting the issue to the jury.25' The Second Cir-
cuit held that the materiality question was one of law.252 The court of
appeals cited only one federal court opinion for this assertion.25 3 That
opinion, in turn, contained no authority for its statement that materiality
was a question of law. The Second Circuit also cited seven state court
opinions for the proposition that materiality was a question of law.254
However, two of the seven cases cited by the Second Circuit actually
treated materiality as a mixed question of law and fact, and not strictly a
question of law.255
249. Id. at 952-53. In Carroll, the evidence adduced at trial showed that the appellant stood
near a bathtub full of champagne and held up a cloak while a Miss Hawley took off her clothes
and climbed into the bathtub. Id. at 953. The appellant then said "the line forms to the right;
come up, gentlemen." Id. Fifteen to twenty men then passed by the tub and filled their glasses
with the beverage. Id. However, the appellant testified before a grand jury that the bathtub
was placed on stage as a convenient receptacle for gingerale. Id. at 952. Moreover, the appel-
lant testified that no one entered the bathtub. Id. The appellant was convicted of perjury. Id.
250. Id. at 954.
251. Id
252. Id
253. Id. (citing United States v. Singleton, 54 F. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892)).
254. Id. (citing People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224, 32 P. 11 (1893) (conviction for perjury
after defendant gave false testimony; materiality of some statements treated at trial as question
of fact; court of appeal reversed, stating trial court must determine materiality based on facts
found by jury); State v. Greenberg, 92 Conn. 657, 103 A. 897 (1918) (conviction for perjury
after defendant gave false testimony; materiality of statements treated at trial as question of
fact; appellate court held trial court ruling to be erroneous, but affirmed conviction on harm-
less error grounds); People v. Glenn, 294 Ill. 333, 128 N.E. 532 (1920) (conviction for perjury
after defendant gave false testimony; materiality of statements treated at trial as question of
fact; appellate court held ruling erroneous, and reversed); Wilkinson v. People, 226 Il1. 135, 80
N.E. 699 (1907) (conviction for perjury after defendant gave false testimony; materiality of
statements treated at trial as question of fact; held on appeal that materiality should be as-
sessed by court after jury finds facts surrounding suspect statement); State v. Brown, 128 Iowa
24, 102 N.W. 799 (1905) (conviction for perjury after defendant gave false testimony; material-
ity treated at trial as question of law; ruling and conviction affirmed); State v. Lewis, 10 Kan.
157 (1872) (conviction for perjury after defendant gave false testimony; materiality treated at
trial as question of fact; appellate court held trial court ruling to be erroneous, but affirmed
conviction on harmless error grounds); People ex rel. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. 1, 87
N.E. 792 (1909) (conviction for perjury after defendant filed report falsely stating that defend-
ant's insurance company had no loans secured by pledges of stocks, bonds or other collateral;
materiality of false information held at trial and on appeal to be question of law)).
255. See Wilkinson v. People, 226 Ill. 135, 147, 80 N.E. 699, 703 (1907); People v. Lem
You, 97 Cal. 224, 228-30, 32 P. 11, 12-13 (1893). When materiality is treated as a mixed
question of law and fact, the court still determines the materiality of a statement. Luse v.
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The second case cited by the Sinclair Court was United States v.
Singleton. 6 In Singleton, the defendant was charged with giving false
testimony in a proceeding for "final proof" of a homestead entry.257 Al-
legedly, the defendant had falsely testified that a homesteader had settled
and cultivated certain land for more than five years.25 ' The district court
sustained a demurrer to the indictment because the indictment did not
illustrate the materiality of the statement.259 In sustaining the demurrer,
the court stated that the question of materiality is for the court.260 How-
ever, the court did not support this statement with any cases or
reasoning.
261
The third case cited by Sinclair was Cothram v. State.262 In
Cothram, the defendant was convicted of falsely testifying during a civil
suit. 263 He appealed. 264 The conviction was reversed because, among
other reasons, the trial court was found to have erroneously submitted
the materiality question to the jury as a question of fact.265 According to
the appellate court, the issue should have been decided by the trial court
as a question of law.266 Unfortunately, the Cothram court did not give
any rationale for this rule, nor did the court support its rule with any
case law.
Sinclair, then, is based on an arguably erroneous analogy to rele-
vancy, and on case law which provides no rationale and little authority
for the rule asserted. Moreover, the Sinclair rule is not constitutionally
required. 267 For this reason, Sinclair should not be seen as justifying
treating materiality as an exception to the due process requirements em-
bodied in Winship.
United States, 49 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1931). However, the court does not determine the
facts on which the materiality decision is based. Rather, the jury determines the facts. Id.
256. 54 F. 488 (S.D. Ala. 1892).
257. Id. at 489.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 489-90.
260. Id. at 489.
261. Id.
262. 39 Miss. 541 (1860).
263. Id. at 546.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 547. The court gave three additional reasons for reversing the conviction. Id. at
546-47. First, the jury was not informed that perjury requires a false statement that was in-
tended to be false, and not merely an intentional statement that was also false. Id. Second, the
jury instructions were premised on an incorrect version of the facts of the case. Id. at 547.
Third, the jury instructions did not explain the law of perjury. Rather, the jury was instructed
to find the appellant guilty if they found he had made the false statement and "the case [was]
otherwise made out." Id.
266. Id.
267. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
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C. Kungys v. United States Does Not Require that Materiality Be
Treated as a Question of Law
The Court's statement in Kungys v. United States268 that materiality
is a question of law should not be seen as determinative of the section
1001 materiality question for three reasons. First, the Court in that case
directed the litigants to brief the issue of whether the materiality require-
ment of 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) was a question of law or fact.269 However,
neither party argued that because materiality was a factual element of a
section 1451(a) offense, In re Winship270 required that it be proven to the
trier of fact.2 71 Since the Court was not presented with a Winship chal-
lenge to Sinclair v. United States,272 it did not decide a Winship challenge
to the Sinclair rule. Even after Kungys, then, Winship arguably still re-
quires that the trier of fact decide materiality.
2 71
Second, the Court's statement regarding section 1001's materiality
question is not persuasive. The Kungys Court supported its reiteration of
the Sinclair rule with a quote from United States v. Abadi:274
[A]lthough the materiality of a statement rests upon a fac-
tual evidentiary showing, the ultimate finding of materiality
turns on an interpretation of substantive law. Since it is the
court's responsibility to interpret the substantive law, we be-
lieve [it is proper to treat] the issue of materiality as a legal
question.275
The problem with this statement is that the materiality of a false
statement, or a concealed fact, often turns on facts, not law.276 Since it is
the trier of fact's responsibility to determine facts,2 77 the materiality
question should not be decided by the court as a question of law. Third,
and finally, the Kungys Court's statements regarding the section 1001
materiality question should be viewed as dicta, since Kungys involved the
268. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
269. Id. at 766 n.4.
270. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
271. United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp. 828, 842 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("the Kungys Court
did not have before it and therefore of course did not decide a Winship challenge to Sinclair.").
272. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
273. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Winship.
274. 706 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
275. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772 (quoting United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983)).
276. See supra notes 155-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual nature of
the materiality question.
277. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (quoting People v. Flack, 125
N.Y. 324, 334, 26 N.E. 267, 270 (1891)).
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interpretation of a different statute.278
V. CONCLUSION
In re Winship 2 79 requires that every element of a criminal offense be
proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the trier of fact.28 ° However, most
federal circuit courts follow Sinclair v. United States21 and treat section
1001's materiality requirement as a question of law.282
The courts offer two reasons why the Winship rule does not control
the question of materiality under section 1001. The first reason, accord-
ing to the Sixth Circuit, is that materiality is not an element of a section
1001 offense.2 3 However, the Sixth Circuit may be mistaken. The mate-
riality requirement of section 1001 fits the Winship description of ele-
ments that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of
fact. 28 4 Moreover, the majority of federal circuits hold that materiality is
an "essential element" of a section 1001 offense;285 that is, materiality is a
fact that must be proven to convict under section 1001. Finally,
although the requirement of materiality is not explicit in the false state-
ment clause of section 1001, materiality may still be an element of that
offense in the same manner that intent was a silent, but judicially implied
and thus required, element in Morissette v. United States286 and United
278. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772.
279. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
280. Id. at 361-64. See also supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Winship.
281. 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
282. United States v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 31 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Brantley,
786 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986); United States v. Greber, 760
F.2d 68, 73 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985); United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359,
1362 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984); United States v. Abadi, 706 F.2d 178,
180 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983); United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.4
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Adler, 623 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (8th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Bernard, 384 F.2d 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Ivey, 322 F.2d 523, 529 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 953 (1963); Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
283. Abadi, 706 F.2d at 180.
284. See supra notes 150-228 and accompanying text for a discussion of materiality's status
as an element of a section 1001 offense.
285. Corsino, 812 F.2d at 30 (First Circuit); Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327 (Seventh Circuit);
Greber, 760 F.2d at 73 (Third Circuit); Lopez, 728 F.2d at 1362 (Eleventh Circuit); Abadi, 706
F.2d at 180 (Sixth Circuit); United States v. Irwin, 654 F.2d 671, 677 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Voorhees, 593 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1975); Freidus v. United States, 223 F.2d 598, 601
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
286. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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States v. United States Gypsum Co. 2 87
A second reason given by one federal circuit court for treating mate-
riality as a question of law, in the face of the Winship rule, is that Sinclair
can be viewed as an exception to Winship.288 However, as discussed
above, none of the rationales for the Sinclair rule are compelling enough
to justify treating Sinclair as an exception to Winship.289 Finally, the
Court's reiteration of the Sinclair rule, in Kungys v. United States,290 does
not require that courts treat materiality as a question of law because the
Kungys Court was not presented with a Winship challenge to Sinclair.2 91
The rationales of the Sinclair rule do not firmly support the rule that
materiality is a question of law.292 If the United States Supreme Court is
directly confronted with a Winship challenge to Sinclair, the Court
should find Winship controlling. This Comment maintains that, to the
extent proof of materiality is necessary to convict under section 1001,
due process requires that materiality be proven beyond a reasodnable
doubt to the trier of fact.
Kenneth M. Miller*
287. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
288. Brantley, 786 F.2d at 1327; United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (5th Cir.
1983).
289. See supra notes 229-78 and accompanying text.
290. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
291. United States v. Taylor, 693 F. Supp. 828, 841-42 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
292. See Sinclair, 279 U.S. at 298-99; Kungys, 485 U.S: at 772. See also supra notes 229-78
and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationales for the Sinclair rule.
* This Comment is dedicated to the memory of my father, Morley L. Miller. I would
also like to thank my family for giving me the strength to get through law school. Finally, I
want to thank Karen L. Poston for helping make this Comment possible.
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